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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Mr. Steelsmith appeals from the district court's judgment of conviction following 
his guilty plea to felony driving under the influence (hereinafter, DUI). He alleges that 
the district court made several errors in its orders and respectfully requests this Court to 
remedy those errors. 
First, the district court erred when it imposed costs, fines, and a driver's license 
suspension after Mr. Steelsmith's period of retained jurisdiction. This action was not 
only done without jurisdiction under Idaho's statutory structure, but was also done in 
violation of the state and federal constitutional protections against double jeopardy. 
Second, the district court abused its discretion when it decided to relinquish 
jurisdiction. It did so without sufficiently considering various mitigating factors, including 
the fact that Mr. Steelsmith's age affected his participation in the rider program, the fact 
that he had finally begun effective rehabilitation, the fact that he continued to have 
significant family and community support, and the fact that this was his first felony 
offense. This decision was, therefore, an abuse of the district court's discretion. 
Finally, the district court denied Mr. Steelsmith's Idaho Criminal Rule 35 
(hereinafter, Rule 35) motion without sufficiently considering the new evidence he 
presented, which demonstrated that he was continuing to rehabilitate and, as such, 
presented less of a risk to society. Therefore, the denial of his Rule 35 motion was also 
an abuse of the district court's discretion. 
1 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Steelsmith is an alcoholic. His past is marred by DUI convictions. (See 
Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), pp.3-5.) 1 He had a blood alcohol 
content of 0.224 on this particular occasion. (Tr., p.15, Ls.1-4.) However, he accepted 
responsibility for his actions and pled guilty to felony DUI. (Tr., p.16, Ls.1B-20.) At his 
sentencing hearing, Mr. Steelsmith expressed his sincere remorse for his actions. 
(Tr., p.26, Ls.7-14.) He also demonstrated his amenability to rehabilitation. (Tr., p.29, 
Ls.16-22.) Under the terms of the plea agreement, the prosecutor recommended a 
period of retained jurisdiction, although he told the district court that he had considered 
recommending probation because of his concern that Mr. Steelsmith would struggle 
with the rider program due to his age.2 (Tr., p.21, Ls.17-23.) Mr. Steelsmith requested 
a period of probation and outpatient treatment. (Tr., p.25, Ls.24-25.) 
One of the considerations for that recommendation was that Mr. Steelsmith had 
recently been reunited with his daughter and her children. (Tr., p.24, L.24 - p.25, LA.) 
Mr. Steelsmith's brother, James, believed Mr. Steelsmith's issues underlying his alcohol 
abuse began when his in-laws successfully sued for custody of his daughter. 
(PSI, pp.7-B.) They bore significant animosity toward Mr. Steelsmith, which resulted in 
a twenty-two year period of non-contact between father and daughter. (PSI, pp.9-10.) 
Now that she is back in his life, she, along with his brother, wants to help Mr. Steelsmith 
learn to effectively deal with his alcoholism. (PSI, pp.7-10.) They both demonstrated 
1 PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file 
"SteelsmithPSl.pdf." Included in this file is the PSI report as well as all the documents 
attached thereto (i.e., police reports, addendum from rider program staff). 
2 Mr. Steelsmith was fifty-four years old at the time, and the prosecutor noted that was 
rather old compared to other people who would be participating in the rider program. 
(Tr., p.21, Ls.22-23.) 
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their continuing support for him by appearing at hearings in this case. (See Tr., p.23, 
Ls.19-20.) 
In addition, Mr. Steelsmith has a good employment history, remaining steadily 
employed since 1995, and only changing jobs when his employers were forced to 
downsize or terminate their businesses. 3 (PSI, p.11.) He also pursued advanced 
education opportunities and earned an Associate's Degree in Civil Engineering and 
Drafting. (PSI, p.10.) And while his criminal record is not particularly encouraging, as it 
contains numerous misdemeanors, it does reveal that he has only one other potential 
felony conviction, which would be thirty-three years old at the time of the instant offense, 
if the charge had actually resulted in a conviction.4 (PSI, pp.3-6.) 
Nevertheless, the district court sentenced Mr. Steelsmith to a ten-year unified 
sentence, with two years fixed, but retained jurisdiction for one year while 
Mr. Steelsmith participated in a rider program. (R., p.62.) In addition, the district court 
ordered $310 in restitution to the county for the costs associated with the blood draw 
officers performed on Mr. Steelsmith in this case. (R., p.63.) However, the district court 
"defer[red] imposition of costs, fines and other assessments, if any, and will take these 
up at the rider review hearing." (R., p.62.) It then ordered that Mr. Steelsmith be 
remanded to the custody of the Ada County Sheriff, to be transported "FORTHWITH by 
him into the custody of the State of Idaho Board of Correction." (R., p.63 (emphasis in 
original).) It informed Mr. Steelsmith that, in doing so, it was executing his imposed 
3 He was temporarily laid off from his most recent job for a DUI-related incident, but 
upon returning to that job, he had been doing well until the instant offense. (PSI, p.11.) 
4 There are two felony charges in Mr. Steelsmith's record. The charge from 1978 has 
no recorded disposition. (PSI, p.3.) The other charge, from 1998, was dismissed. 
(PSI, p.4.) There is no indication in his record that he has been subjected to felony 
probation before. (See PSI, pp.3-6.) 
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sentence. (Tr., p.37, L.23 - p.38, L.1.) He was subsequently sent to the North Idaho 
Correctional Institute for his period of retained jurisdiction. (PSI, p.76.) 
Mr. Steelsmith made a concerted effort to effectively participate in the rider 
program. However, he was discharged when the program staff decided that he was 
not performing adequately. (Tr., p.4D, Ls.3-6.) Nonetheless, Mr. Steelsmith reported 
that he had been a willing participant in several classes and that he had made a good 
faith effort to succeed in the program. (Tr., p.41, Ls.21-25.) In fact, of the three 
programs assigned to him, Mr. Steelsmith had been able to complete two. (PSI, p.77.) 
He also received no disciplinary sanctions, formal or informal, during his period of 
retained jurisdiction. (PSI, p.78) The program staff, however, noted that Mr. Steelsmith 
had trouble trusting the community as well as the program itself during his period of 
retained jurisdiction. (PSI, p.78.) 
The reason for his poor performance, according to defense counsel, was that 
Mr. Steelsmith was approximately thirty years older than the other participants, and that 
made it difficult for him to fully participate in the program. (Tr., p.42, Ls.4-7.) 
Nevertheless, Mr. Steelsmith thanked the district court for putting him through the rider 
program. (Tr., p.42, Ls.18-21.) He then made a detailed report to the district court of 
his progress in understanding his addiction and his plans going forward to reintegrate 
into society while still dealing with his problems. (Tr., pp.42-45.) He also reported that 
he had several options available to him, both in terms of employment and housing, 
should he be released on probation. (Tr., p.44, Ls.9-14, 18-21.) Mr. Steelsmith's 
brother, James, also made a statement to the district court, noting that there had been a 
markable change in Mr. Steelsmith's approach to his life: Mr. Steelsmith had, for the 
first time James could remember, admitted the fact that he was an alcoholic with 
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sincerity. (Tr., p.48, Ls.13-19.) James asked the district court to consider that fact -
that the therapy seemed to have finally broken through to Mr. Steelsmith - when it 
made its decision. (See Tr., p.49, Ls.6-9.) Along with his brother, Mr. Steelsmith's 
father, stepfather, sister, daughter, and support group attended the hearing to show 
their support for him. (Tr., p.44, Ls.22-25.) 
Despite all this information, the district court decided to relinquish jurisdiction. 
(R., p.69.) While it did, sua sponte, reduce Mr. Steelsmith's sentence to seven years, 
with two years fixed, it pointedly refused to consider the possibility of releasing 
Mr. Steelsmith to felony probation. (R., p.69.) It also imposed the additional 
punishments of a $3,000 fine, $490.50 in costs,5 and a three-year absolute driver's 
license at that time. (R., pp.69-70.) 
He subsequently filed a Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence. (R., p.7S.) 
The district court permitted him to supplement his motion, which he did, providing 
various documents demonstrating his dedication to the rehabilitation programs to which 
he had been assigned or chose to join. (Supp. R, pp.9-21, 25-26.) He also received 
reaffirmations of support from his father, brother, and daughter. (Supp. R, pp.22-23.) 
Additionally, he presented his letter of acceptance to the Boise Rescue Mission's New 
Life Recovery Program. (Supp. R., p.24.) Despite all this evidence, the district court 
determined that Mr. Steelsmith's history of DUI offenses justified the continued service 
5 The district court apparently listed the wrong code section for the county surcharge 
fee, and Mr. Steelsmith believes the proper citation is I.C. § 31-3201(3), not I.C. § 31-
4502, which is the Declaration of Necessity and Purpose of the Idaho Pollution Control 
Financing Act. (See R., p.69.) Also, as to the domestic violence fund fee, the district 
court omitted the code citation, which Mr. Steelsmith believes to be I.C. § 32-1410. 
(See R, p.70.) 
5 
of his seven-year unified sentence. (Augmentation - Memorandum Decision and Order 
Re: Rule 35 Motion.) 
Mr. Steelsmith timely appealed from the order relinquishing jurisdiction. 
(R., pp.73-76.) He challenges the imposition of the new fines, costs, and driver's 
license suspension as beyond the district court's jurisdiction and as violating the state 
and federal constitutional protections against double jeopardy. He also alleges that the 
district court insufficiently considered various mitigating factors and so imposed his 
sentence in an abuse of discretion. Finally, he alleges that the district court abused its 
discretion by insufficiently considering the new evidence he presented in support of his 
Rule 35 motion. 
6 
ISSUES 
1. Whether the district court erred by imposing various punishments at the rider 
review hearing in violation of jurisdictional limitations and the state and federal 
constitutional protections against double jeopardy. 
2. Whether the district court abused its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction by 
not sufficiently considering the factors which indicated that Mr. Steelsmith would 
be able to succeed in a less structured environment. 
3. Whether the district court abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Steelsmith's 
Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence in light of the new evidence he 
presented. 
7 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
The District Court Erred By Imposing Various Punishments At The Rider Review 
Hearing In Violation Of Jurisdictional Limitations And The State And Federal 
Constitutional Protections Against Double Jeopardy 
A. Introduction 
The district court entered a judgment imposing and executing Mr. Steelsmith's 
sentence at the original sentencing hearing, but it did not impose fines, costs, or 
a driver's license suspension at that time. Instead, it deferred imposition of those 
punishments until after Mr. Steelsmith completed his period of retained jurisdiction. 
However, doing so violated Idaho's statutory limitations on the district court's jurisdiction 
and violated the state and federal constitutional protections against double jeopardy. 
This Court should remedy that error by vacating these additional punishments. 
B. By Imposing Fines And Costs After The Period Of Retained Jurisdiction, The 
District Court Acted Beyond Its Jurisdictional Limitations 
The district court did not have jurisdiction to impose the fines, costs, and driver's 
license suspension at a date later than the original sentencing hearing. The statutory 
provision governing retaining jurisdiction provides: 
Whenever any person shall have been convicted, or enter a plea of 
guilty ... the court in its discretion, [sic] may: 
4. Suspend the execution of the judgment at any time during the first three 
hundred sixty-five (365) days of a sentence to the custody of the state 
board of correction. The court shall retain jurisdiction over the prisoner for 
a period of up to the first three hundred sixty-five (365) days ... During 
the period of retained jurisdiction, the state board of correction shall be 
responsible for determining the placement of the prisoner and such 
education, programming and treatment as it determines to be appropriate. 
The prisoner will remain committed to the board of correction if not 
affirmatively placed on probation by the court. 
8 
I.C. § 19-2601 (4). As a result of the fact that execution of the sentence is suspended, 
"[s]entencing occurs before the period of retained jurisdiction begins, not when 
jurisdiction is relinquished." State v. Coassolo, 136 Idaho 138, 142-43 (2001). As such, 
the district court "may suspend the sentence and place the defendant on probation or 
may relinquish jurisdiction over the defendant, thereby allowing execution of the original 
sentence of imprisonment." State v. Goodlett, 139 Idaho 262, 264 (Ct. App. 2003) 
(emphasis added). Consequently, there is only one point at which the district court may 
impose punishments - the sentencing hearing. See Coassolo, 136 Idaho at 142-43. 
This is because once a valid sentence is imposed and executed, the district court 
no longer has jurisdiction to modify that sentence. State v. Johnson, 101 Idaho 581, 
585 (1980); see also United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304, 308 (1931) (discussing the 
general jurisdictional limits on sentencing courts). The only exception to that rule is that 
the district court may reduce the sentence pursuant to Rule 35. Goodlett, 139 Idaho at 
264; see also State v. Timbana, 145 Idaho 779, 782 (2008) (applying this same rule to 
the decision to revoke probation). The sentence is imposed at the sentencing hearing. 
Coassolo, 136 Idaho at 142-43; see also I.C. § 19-2512 ("If no sufficient cause is 
alleged or appears to the court why judgment should not be pronounced, it must 
thereupon be rendered.") The sentence is executed at the point at which the 
defendant has been remanded to the custody of the Department of Correction. 
State v. McGonigal, 122 Idaho 939, 940 (1992); State v. Williams, 126 Idaho 39, 44 
(1994); State v. Petersen, 149 Idaho 808, 812-13 (Ct. App. 2010). As a result, the 
sentence is imposed and executed before the period of retained jurisdiction begins. 
Therefore, upon relinquishment of jurisdiction, the district court's only options are to 
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leave the sentence as it is, or to reduce it pursuant to Rule 35. See Goodlett, 139 Idaho 
at 264; Timbana, 145 Idaho at 782. 
This is true, even though the district keeps concurrent jurisdiction with the 
Department of Correction because that concurrent jurisdiction is limited. See 
I.C. § 19-2601(4); Petersen, 149 Idaho at 812 ("The court must decide whether to grant 
probation or relinquish jurisdiction and execute the defendant's original sentence. If the 
district court does not affirmatively grant probation, the defendant remains committed to 
the [Department of Correction]."). As such, the district court's continuing jurisdiction 
over the defendant's sentence is limited by the jurisdiction of the Department of 
Correction, which is set forth by the original sentence. See Petersen, 149 Idaho at 812. 
Therefore, even though it maintained jurisdiction over Mr. Steelsmith, the district court 
had no jurisdiction to increase his sentence at the rider review hearing. See Coassolo, 
136 Idaho at 142-43. Since the district court did not impose the fine, costs, and license 
suspension until the rider review hearing, and by that point, it no longer had jurisdiction 
to impose those punishments, and these portions of Mr. Steelsmith's sentence must be 
vacated. 
There are certain exceptions to the requirement that the entire judgment be set 
forth at sentencing, but those exceptions are expressly identified, narrowly defined, and 
primarily directed at ensuring that the victims of the crime (if any) are made whole. 
See I. C. § 19-5307 (imposition of fines for certain, enumerated "violent felonies" may be 
deferred because they serve as a civil judgment entered on behalf of the victim of that 
violent felony); State v. Jensen, 149 Idaho 758, 762 (2010) (quoting State v. Ferguson, 
138 Idaho 659, 662 (2002)) (restitution orders are expressly permitted to be deferred for 
"a reasonable amount of time necessary to gather information so as to locate all victims 
10 
and correctly compute the amount of restitution" in order to ensure all the victims are 
properly compensated (emphasis in original)). Those exceptions are inapplicable in this 
case, however, because Mr. Steelsmith did not commit one of the enumerated violent 
felonies, (I.C. § 19-5307(2)), and all the victims had been located and a full calculation 
of restitution had been made and ordered at the original sentencing. (Tr., p.36, 
Ls.14-16; R., p.63.) Furthermore, there is no provision in I.C. § 18-8005 which allows 
for a deferral of the imposition of the fines, costs, or license suspension.6 Therefore, 
without a legal reason for why the judgment should not have been rendered at 
sentencing (as there was no good cause to offer a motion for an arrest of judgment or 
for a new trial) the district court acted without jurisdiction by delaying the imposition of 
the fine, costs, and license suspension. See I.C. §§ 19-2511, 19-2512. 
As a result, the district court only had jurisdiction to impose a sentence on 
Mr. Steelsmith at his sentencing hearing. It acted within that jurisdiction, imposing a 
sentence which included a prison term and restitution. (See Tr., p.35, L.1 - p.36, 
L.20; R., pp.61-63.) It specifically "defer[red] imposition of costs, fines and other 
assessments," intending to "take these up at the rider review hearing." (R., p.62 
(emphasis added); see a/so Tr., p.36, LS.17-20 (oral pronouncement of the same, but 
without mentioning the imposition of fines).) That sentence was executed when the 
district court remanded Mr. Steelsmith "to the custody of the Sheriff of Ada County, to 
be delivered FORTHWITH by him into the custody of the State of Idaho Board of 
Correction." (See R., p.63 (emphasis in original); Tr., p.37, L.23 - p.38, L.1.) Therefore, 
as a valid sentence had been both imposed and executed, the district court did not have 
6 Specifically, Mr. Steelsmith was sentenced pursuant to I.C. § 18-8005(6). (R., p.62) 
None of the subsections therein provide for such a deferral for the imposition of those 
punishments either. See I.C. 18-8005(6)(b), (6)(d). 
11 
jurisdiction at the rider review hearing to increase Mr. Steelsmith's sentence by 
imposing new fines, costs, and suspensions. See Petersen, 149 Idaho at 812-13; 
Williams, 126 Idaho 39, 44; McGonigal, 122 Idaho at 940. Instead, all it had the 
jurisdiction to do was decrease the already-imposed sentence pursuant to Rule 35. 
See Goodlett, 139 Idaho at 264; Timbana, 145 Idaho at 782. 
Because the punishments imposed at the rider review hearing (the fine, the 
costs, and the license suspension) were imposed by the district court when it did not 
have jurisdiction, they must be vacated. 
C. Imposing Fines And Costs After The Period Of Retained Jurisdiction Violates The 
State And Federal Constitutional Protections Against Double Jeopardy 
Should this Court determine that the district court had jurisdiction to impose the 
additional punishments, it must still vacate them, as they violate the state and federal 
constitutional protections against double jeopardy. And although neither Mr. Steelsmith 
nor his attorney objected to the district court's imposition of those punishments at the 
rider review hearing, this Court may still review and remedy that action, as it constitutes 
a fundamental error. 
Although an error may not be objected to before the district court, Idaho appellate 
courts maintain the ability to conduct a limited review in such cases, if the error violates 
a constitutionally-protected right, as it constitutes fundamental error. State v. Perry, 150 
Idaho 209, 226 (2010), reh'g denied. To show fundamental error, the defendant must 
demonstrate that the alleged error: "(1) violates one or more of the defendant's 
unwaived constitutional rights; (2) the error is clear or obvious without the need for 
reference to any additional information not contained in the appellate record; and (3) the 
error affected the outcome of the trial proceedings." Perry, 150 Idaho at 228; 
12 
State v. Corbus, 151 Idaho 368, 371 (Ct. App. 2011), rev. denied. If the defendant 
makes this showing, the appellate court is to vacate the sentence and remand the 
case. Perry, 150 Idaho at 228. In this case, the imposition of the new, additional 
punishments violated Mr. Steelsmith's unwaived state and federal constitutional rights to 
be free from double jeopardy, the error is clear and obvious from the record, and the 
error affected the outcome of the proceedings because it increased his sentence. As 
such, it is fundamental error, and this Court may provide a remedy for that violation. 
1. The Imposition Of The New, Additional Costs Violated Mr. Steelsmith's 
Unwaived Constitutional Right To Be Free From Double Jeopardy 
The United States Constitution provides that "No person shall be ... subject for 
the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
The federal protection against double jeopardy has been incorporated against the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 
(1969). The Idaho Constitution provides the same protection as the federal constitution. 
IDAHO CONST. Art. I, § 13. Article I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution is coextensive 
with its federal counterpart. State v. McKeeth, 136 Idaho 619,624 (Ct. App. 2001). 
These protections can be violated in three ways: (1) engaging in a second 
prosecution for the same offense after an acquittal has been entered; (2) engaging in a 
second prosecution for the same offense after a conviction has been entered; and 
(3) imposing multiple punishments for the same offense. United States v. DiFrancesco, 
449 U.S. 117, 129 (1980); McKeeth, 136 Idaho at 622. Illegally increasing an imposed 
sentence is an example of the third violation. See State v. Mendenhall, 106 Idaho 
388, 395 (Ct. App. 1984). The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that, even if the 
punishments imposed are authorized by the Legislature, imposing them in a second 
13 
proceeding violates the double jeopardy protections. State v. Avelar, 132 Idaho 775, 
778 (1999).7 
As the fine and license suspension were imposed pursuant to I.C. § 18-8005(6), 
which establishes the criminal penalties for a violation of I.C. § 18-8004(1)(a)-(c), the 
fact that they were imposed at the second proceeding (the rider review hearing) reveals 
that they were imposed in violation of the constitutional double jeopardy protections, 
regardless of whether the Legislature authorized them. See Avelar, 132 Idaho at 778; 
see also Petersen, 149 Idaho at 812 ("The court must decide whether to grant probation 
or relinquish jurisdiction and execute the defendant's original sentence."); Mendenhall, 
106 Idaho at 395 (holding that the district court "must refrain from increasing the original 
sentence upon a hindsight view of the appropriate measure of punishment."); Goodlett, 
139 Idaho at 264 (holding that the district court's only options after a sentence is 
imposed and executed are to leave the originally imposed sentence in place or reduce 
that sentence pursuant to Rule 35); Timbana, 145 Idaho 779 (imposing the same rule 
as Goodlett in regard to the revocation of probation). 
7 The Idaho Supreme Court cited to United States v. Halper to support this conclusion. 
490 U.S. 435 (1989). Halper held that the State may not seek a civil penalty that is for 
retributive, as opposed to remedial, purposes in a proceeding separate from the 
proceeding in which the criminal penalty was imposed because doing so constitutes a 
second punishment and so violates the protections against double jeopardy. Halper, 
490 U.S. at 448-49. Halper has, however, been subsequently abrogated because it 
deviated from traditional double jeopardy analysis. Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 
93, 99, 101 (1997). It failed to make the threshold determination of whether the civil 
penalties were so punitive as to transform them into criminal penalties, thus bringing 
them within the realm of the double jeopardy protections, and to assess the statute 
under which the sanctions were imposed, as opposed to the character of the sanctions 
themselves. Id. The Hudson abrogation, however, only attacks the Halper Court's 
consideration of the penalties themselves, not the conclusion that imposing them at a 
second proceeding would violate the double jeopardy protections. See id. As such, the 
Idaho Supreme Court's conclusion in Avelar survives Hudson, so long as the additional 
penalties are appropriately within the scope of the double jeopardy protections. 
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Therefore, by imposing new, additional criminal punishments on Mr. Steelsmith 
at a second proceeding, the district court violated his unwaived state and federal 
constitutional rights to be free from double jeopardy. 
2. The Violation Is Clear And Obvious In The Record 
As to the second of Perry's prongs, the violation in this case is clear from the 
record. The district court imposed various punishments at the sentencing hearing: 
This is what I've concluded in terms of your sentence, sir. I'm going 
to impose a judgment of conviction. I'm going to sentence you to the 
State Board of Correction for a total term of ten years, consisting of two 
years fixed followed by eight years indeterminate. 
In your case, sir, I'm going to retain jurisdiction. I'm going to 
recommend that the Department of Correction consider you for placement 
in either the CAPP Program or the therapeutic community .... 
I will order that you pay restitution in the amount of $310 for the 
costs of the blood draw and the cost of the analysis at the State Lab. 
I will defer imposition of court costs other statutory assessments 
[sic], and I'll defer deciding on a driver's license suspension until I see 
the report from the institution .... 
I'll give you credit for the 113 days that you have served. 
(Tr., p.34, L.24 - p.37, L.6.) It concluded by "remand[ing Mr. Steelsmith] to the custody 
of the Ada County Sheriff for delivery to the proper agent of the State Board of 
Correction in execution of this sentence." (Tr., p.37, L.23 - p.38, L.1.) These same 
terms were reiterated in the judgment of conviction. (R., pp.62-63.) It is, thus, clear 
from this record that Mr. Steelsmith's sentence had been imposed and executed at the 
conclusion of his sentencing hearing. See Coassolo, 136 Idaho at 142-43; McGonigal, 
122 Idaho at 940; Williams, 126 Idaho at 44; Petersen, 149 Idaho at 812-13. It is 
equally clear that the district court would no longer be able to increase the sentence 
after that point. Johnson, 101 Idaho at 585; Benz, 282 U.S. at 308. 
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Yet the record also clearly demonstrates that the district court did, subsequently, 
impose new, additional punishments, thereby increasing Mr. Steelsmith's sentence: 
Mr. Steelsmith, for the reasons that I've explained, I'm going to 
impose8 this [the original] sentence. I'm not going to give you this 
opportunity of probation. 
As an exercise in discretion, under Idaho Criminal Rule 35, on my 
own motion, I'm going to reduce this [the original] sentence as follows: 
You'll be sentenced to the custody of the State Board of Corrections for a 
total term of seven years, consisting of two years fixed followed by five 
years indeterminate. 
I'm going to suspend your driving privileges for an absolute term of 
three years. That suspension will begin when you are released from 
custody. I will order that you pay $310 in restitution. That's $210 for the 
costs of drawing your blood and the hundred dollars for the cost of the lab 
analysis. 
I will order that you pay a $3,000 fine. I will order that you pay all of 
those court costs and statutory assessments, including a reimbursement 
fee in the amount of $250 for services of your appointed counsel. 
In my Judgment of Conviction and Order declining to retain 
jurisdiction, I'm going to ask that the Department of Corrections consider 
you at an appropriate point for placement in the therapeutic community 
that exists within the institution or in the CAPP Program that exists in the 
institution. 
You have served more than one year fixed as you sit here. I'll give 
you credit for the total 372 days that you have served in custody. That 
means you have less than a year on this fixed sentence to serve. 
(Tr., p.50, L.6 - p.51, L.9 (emphasis added).) This written order (R., pp.68-71) reflects 
the decrease in the original sentence, which was appropriate under Rule 35. Goodlett, 
139 Idaho at 264; Timbana, 145 Idaho at 782. It also highlights the illegal additions to 
the sentence, noting that, for the first time in the record, "IT IS FURTHER ORDERED" 
that Mr. Steelsmith's sentence will include various costs, "IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED" 
that he will pay a $3,000 in addition to the originally-imposed restitution, and "IT IS 
8 The district court confused the terminology on this point. Imposition of a sentence 
occurs at the sentencing hearing, before the period of retained jurisdiction begins. 
Coassolo, 136 Idaho at 142-43. During the period of retained jurisdiction, execution of 
the sentence is suspended. I.C. § 19-2601(4). Thus, all the district court is empowered 
to do at this point is resume the executed sentence. See id. 
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HEREBY ORDERED" that his driver's license will be suspended for three years. 
(R., pp.69-70 (emphasis in original).) Therefore, the record clearly and obviously 
indicates that Mr. Steelsmith's sentence was increased at the rider review hearing, an 
action which violated his state and federal constitutional rights to be free from double 
jeopardy. 
3. The District Court's Erroneous Decision To Illegally Impose New, 
Additional Punishments Upon Mr. Steelsmith At The Rider Review 
Hearing Affected The Outcome Of The Proceedings 
The final Perry prong requires that the error affect the outcome of the 
proceedings. That effect is self-evident in this record because, but for the district court's 
illegal imposition of the fine, costs, and license suspension, Mr. Steelsmith would not 
have been subjected to them, as they were not a part of the sentence. As a result, the 
error did affect the outcome of the proceedings. 
Therefore, all three prongs of the Perry test are met: the district court's action 
violated Mr. Steelsmith's unwaived state and federal constitutional rights to be free from 
double jeopardy, the error is clear and obvious from the record, and it affected the 
outcome of the proceedings. Thus, it constitutes a fundamental error and this Court is 
empowered to vacate all those parts of the sentence which were illegally imposed in 
contravention of the state and federal constitutions. 
17 
II. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Relinquished Jurisdiction By Not 
Sufficiently Considering The Factors Which Indicated That Mr. Steelsmith Would Be 
Able To Succeed In A Less Structured Environment 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Steelsmith alleges that the district court's decision to relinquish jurisdiction 
was an abuse of discretion in light of the improvements he made during his period of 
retained jurisdiction, in addition to all the other mitigating factors present in his case. 
The district court's insufficient consideration of these factors resulted in its failure 
to sufficiently consider Idaho's recognized sentencing objectives as they relate to 
Mr. Steelsmith's ability to succeed in a less structured environment. Therefore, it 
abused its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction. This Court should remedy that 
abuse. 
B. The Decision To Relinquish Jurisdiction And Execute The Prison Sentence Was 
An Abuse Of Discretion 
Upon Mr. Steelsmith's return from his rider, the district court decided to relinquish 
jurisdiction and execute his sentence, modified sua sponte to be a seven-year unified 
sentence, with two years fixed. (R., p.69.) Nevertheless, this decision was an abuse of 
discretion. 
The district court's decision to relinquish jurisdiction is reviewed under 
an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Hurst, 151 Idaho 430, 438 (Ct. App. 2011); 
State v. Statton, 136 Idaho 135, 137 (2001). Such a decision will not be considered an 
abuse of discretion "if the trial court has sufficient information to determine that a 
suspended sentence and probation would be inappropriate." State v. Merwin, 131 
Idaho 642, 648 (1998). ''The purpose of retaining jurisdiction after imposing a sentence 
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is to afford the trial court additional time for evaluation of the defendant's rehabilitation 
potential and suitability for probation." State v. Lee, 117 Idaho 203, 205 
(Ct. App. 1990). In making that determination, the district court "considers all of the 
circumstances to assess the defendant's ability to succeed in a less structured 
environment and to determine the course of action that will further the purposes of 
rehabilitation, protection of society, deterrence, and retribution [the sentencing 
objectives]." Statton, 136 Idaho at 137. In this regard, the need to protect society is the 
primary objective the district court should consider. See State v. Charboneau, 124 
Idaho 497, 500 (1993). Therefore, a disposition that protects society and also 
accomplishes the other sentencing objectives will be considered reasonable. See id. 
This is because the protection of society is influenced by each of the other objectives, 
and therefore, each must be addressed in the disposition. See id. 
There are several factors that a court should consider to determine whether the 
objectives are served by a particular disposition. See State v. Knighton, 143 Idaho 
318, 320 (2006). Several of these factors have been identified by the Legislature in 
I.C. § 19-2521, and they guide the district court in making this determination. Merwin, 
131 Idaho at 648. These factors include, but are not limited to: "the defendant's good 
character, status as a first-time offender, sincere expressions of remorse and 
amenability to treatment, and support of family." Knighton, 143 Idaho at 320. 
Insufficient consideration of these factors has been the basis for a more lenient 
sentence in several cases. See, e.g., Cook v. State, 145 Idaho 482,489-90 (Ct. App. 
2008); State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Carrasco, 114 
Idaho 348, 354-55 (Ct. App. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 117 Idaho 295, 301 (1990); 
State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982). In this case, several of those factors were 
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present, but were insufficiently considered by the district court as it issued its disposition 
regarding Mr. Steelsmith after he completed his period of retained jurisdiction. 
A sufficient consideration of these factors, combined with Mr. Steelsmith's 
performance during his period of retained jurisdiction, indicates that he should be able 
to succeed in a less structured environment. See Lee, 117 Idaho at 205. Therefore, a 
disposition providing him with the opportunity to do so will still serve the sentencing 
objectives. As a result, the decision to relinquish jurisdiction does not serve the 
objectives, and is thus an abuse of the district court's discretion. See Statton, 136 
Idaho at 137. 
Mr. Steelsmith did his best to succeed on his rider. (Tr., p.41, L.21 - p.42, L.2.) 
He was an eager participant in the classes. (Tr., p.41, Ls.23-24; PSI, pp.86-87 (5/10/11 
C-Note and 3/15/11 C-Note).) He did not receive any disciplinary sanctions, either 
formal or informal, during his period of retained jurisdiction. (PSI, p.78.) The underlying 
reason for his difficulty in completing the program had been foreseen by the prosecutor, 
and caused him to consider recommending probation instead of retained jurisdiction. 
(See Tr., p.21, Ls.17-23.) Due to his age, Mr. Steelsmith found it difficult to complete 
the program, which was designed for, and populated by, people more than half his age. 
(See Tr., p.42, Ls.4-7.) This was a significant factor which the district court needed to 
sufficiently consider in its disposition following Mr. Steelsmith's period of retained 
jurisdiction. 
As the program staff noted, Mr. Steelsmith's problems emerged from a difficulty 
to trust his community or the program. (PSI, p.78.) This is consistent with his 
explanation that it was the age difference which underlay the problems. The age gap 
would create the difficulty to trust his community members. As the prosecutor noted at 
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sentencing, the program was designed for younger offenders. (Tr., p.21, Ls.17-23.) As 
such, Mr. Steelsmith's age would significantly contribute to his difficulty trusting the 
members of his community, and so, the program. Therefore, his age had a significant 
impact on his ability to complete the program, which is the reason the prosecutor 
considered recommending probation instead at the original sentencing hearing. 
(Tr., p.21, Ls.17-23.) Rather than risk a failed rider, the prosecutor - the community's 
representative in these proceedings - indicated that probation might be a better means 
to address the sentencing objectives. (See Tr., p.21, Ls.18-19.) 
Age of the offender is an important factor in the sentencing determination, since it 
impacts the likelihood that he will reoffend, and thus the need for society to be protected 
from him. See I.C. § 19-2521 (1)(a), (2)(h). For example the Court of Appeals has 
recognized that the older an offender gets, the less likely he is to reoffend. See Cook, 
145 Idaho at 489 (admonishing that sentences are to be crafted so that they do not 
force the prison system to continue detaining a person once rehabilitation or age has 
decreased the risk of recidivism); State v. Eubank, 114 Idaho 635, 639 (Ct. App. 1988) 
(same). When considered in conjunction with his efforts during the period of retained 
jurisdiction, Mr. Steelsmith's age indicates that the risk of him reoffending has been 
significantly decreased. Therefore, forcing the prison system to continue to detain him 
by relinquishing jurisdiction and executing the original prison sentence operates 
contrary to the admonitions from Cook and Eubank. 
Nevertheless, Mr. Steelsmith put forth a good faith effort to complete the rider 
program, and it did have a significant impact on him. (See Tr., pA8, L.9 - pA9, L.25.) 
Mr. Steelsmith's brother, James, addressed the district court at the review hearing, 
noting that, for the first time James could remember, Mr. Steelsmith had admitted his 
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alcoholism "with sincerity and conviction." (Tr., p.48, Ls.10-19.) James pleaded with 
the district court to be lenient with its disposition because Mr. Steelsmith had 
experienced a breakthrough and he now had an opportunity to get his alcoholism under 
control. (Tr., p.49, Ls.1-9.) Mr. Steelsmith himself explained the extent of that 
breakthrough to the district court. (Tr., pp.42-45.) He also informed the district court 
that if his old job would not take him back, he had several other opportunities available 
to him. (Tr., p.44, Ls.9-14.) Furthermore, Mr. Steelsmith had several options for 
temporary housing, including through the Boise Rescue Mission, while he secured a 
permanent residence. (Tr., p.44, Ls.18-21.) This all indicates that he would likely be 
able to succeed in a less structured environment, and therefore, a more lenient 
disposition is justified. See Statton, 136 Idaho at 137. 
Mr. Steelsmith also continued to express his remorse, as well as his amenability 
to treatment and rehabilitation.9 (See Tr., p.45, Ls.11-23.) Acknowledgment of guilt and 
acceptance of responsibility by the defendant are critical first steps toward rehabilitation. 
See State v. Kellis, 148 Idaho 812, 815 (Ct. App. 2010), rev. denied. By making these 
two acknowledgements, Mr. Steelsmith demonstrated that he has taken these critical 
first steps. 
His brother's statement also underscores the support Mr. Steelsmith has from his 
family. In fact, his family and friends made a significant show of support for him in the 
9 Before his initial sentencing, Mr. Steelsmith expressed his sincere remorse, and more 
importantly, his desire to accept responsibility for, as he described it, "a very bad 
decision on location and I fell off the wagon and had a couple of drinks, and shame on 
me." (Tr., p.26, Ls.7-14.) He also expressed a willingness to accept the consequences 
of his actions, noting that "[m]y jail time is necessary." (Tr., p.27, Ls.12-14.) He 
pled guilty in this case, realizing that by doing so, he would forfeit several of his 
constitutional rights and liberties. (Tr., p.6, Ls.11-17.) 
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courtroom as his father, stepfather, brother, sister, daughter, and support group all 
attended the rider review hearing. (Tr., p.44, Ls.22-25.) This showing demonstrates the 
fact that Mr. Steelsmith has a strong support network in place to help him continue his 
rehabilitation should he be put on probation. This, too, makes it more likely that he will 
be able to succeed in a less structured environment, which justifies a more lenient 
disposition. See Statton, 136 Idaho at 137. 
His relationship with his daughter makes this particular disposition unique and 
illustrates why the instant case demands leniency. As part of successful rehabilitation, 
the subject needs to build a strong support network. One part of that network comes 
from relationships with family members, including children. See Kellis, 148 Idaho at 817 
(holding that familial support offered to affirm the defendant's innocence does not 
equate to familial support offered in consideration of rehabilitation, implying that had the 
support been offered for rehabilitation, it would be a mitigating factor worthy of 
consideration). Mr. Steelsmith had been estranged from his daughter for over twenty 
years, and she had just recently reinitiated contact with him. (Tr., p.6, Ls.1-2.) In 
addition, she introduced him to his grandchildren. (Tr., p.24, L.24 - p.25, L.2.) This 
presented a unique opportunity for Mr. Steelsmith to grow that strong support network 
by forging new relationships with his daughter and grandchildren. He never had that 
opportunity before and that was a critical fact the district court needed to sufficiently 
consider. See Shideler, 103 Idaho at 594-95. However, there is no indication in the 
transcript that the district court considered it at all. (See generally Tr., pp.49-53.) 
Furthermore, Mr. Steelsmith's brother told the presentence investigator that he 
believed the issues underlying Mr. Steelsmith's alcohol abuse began when his in-laws 
successfully sued for custody of his daughter. (PSI, pp.7-8.) There was a lot of 
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animosity toward Mr. Steelsmith from his in-laws, which resulted in a twenty-two year 
period of non-contact between father and daughter. (PSI, pp.9-1 D.) However, since 
she has re-entered his life, the potential to deal with those underlying issues effectively 
has become significantly increased. This means that, despite his history of alcohol 
abuse, he has a better chance to rehabilitate now as one of the underlying causes can 
be resolved. A sufficient consideration of this factor, therefore, reveals that a more 
lenient disposition, one which permitted Mr. Steelsmith to engage in significant 
outpatient treatment with the increased support of his family and to address his 
addiction in a real-world situation, would best serve the objectives, particularly 
rehabilitation, and thereby, the protection afforded society.10 Therefore, a more lenient 
disposition still serves the objectives, and so is justified in this case. See Statton, 136 
Idaho at 137. 
Another factor the district court needed to sufficiently consider was 
Mr. Steelsmith's work history. He had remained employed since 1995, only changing 
jobs when his employers were forced to downsize or terminate their businesses. 11 (PSI, 
p.11.) In addition, he has pursued advanced education opportunities and earned an 
Associate's Degree in Civil Engineering and Drafting. (PSI, p.1D.) A good employment 
history is a factor the district court should consider in mitigation at sentencing. See 
State v. Hagedorn, 129 Idaho 155, 161 (Ct. App. 1996). 
10 Even the GAIN-I evaluation, which was apparently conducted before his daughter 
re-entered his life (as it describes him as having no children) recommended that 
Mr. Steelsmith be afforded the opportunity to participate in outpatient treatment. (PSI, 
pp.5D,58.) 
11 He was temporarily laid off from his most recent job for a DUI-related incident, but 
upon returning to that job, he had been doing well until the instant offense. (PSI, p.11.) 
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Additionally, this was the first time Mr. Steelsmith's record indicates he had been 
found guilty of a felony.12 (See PSI, pp.3-5.) And even if it indicates that it is not, 
his only other felony conviction would be thirty three years old, and the Legislature 
has indicated such a situation weighs against incarcerating a defendant. See 
I.C. § 19-2521 (2)(g). And despite the fact that he has a lengthy record, even a repeat 
offender will not be subjected to excessive sentences. See Carrasco, 114 Idaho at 355. 
This does not excuse his past criminal history. Rather it recognizes that rehabilitation 
will help him overcome those past behavioral problems, and thus increase the 
protection the disposition affords society. See Charboneau, 124 Idaho at 500. 
Furthermore, the Idaho Supreme Court has also "recognized that the first offender 
should be accorded more lenient treatment than the habitual criminal." Shideler, 103 
Idaho at 595 (quoting Owen, 73 Idaho at 402). As such, the Shideler Court considered 
the fact that the defendant in that case had no prior felonies in mitigation along with 
other factors, all of which justified a more lenient sentence. 
In fact, Mr. Steelsmith's situation is almost identical the one the Idaho Supreme 
Court considered in Shideler. Mr. Shideler had pled guilty to armed robbery. Shideler, 
103 Idaho at 593. However, the Court recognized that "since the incident and 
incarceration pending hearing, he [Mr. Shideler] has markedly changed his dependency 
on prescription medication, with great improvement in his mental attitude and stability." 
Id. at 595. Furthermore, "[b]esides this being his first felony, the record discloses that 
the defendant has accepted responsibility for his acts, and that his family and employer 
12 There are two other felony charges on his record. (PSI, pp.3-5.) The charge from 
1978 has no recorded disposition. (PSI, p.3.) The charge from 1998 was dismissed. 
(PSI, p.4.) 
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have shown considerable interest in his future." Id. All this led it to "conclude that the 
defendant's character and the circumstances surrounding the case are compelling in 
nature, and sufficiently outweigh the gravity of the crime and the protection of the 
public interest to require us in the furtherance of justice to reduce the sentence." Id. 
Therefore, it ordered that Mr. Shideler's indeterminate twenty-year sentence be reduced 
to a twelve-year indeterminate sentence. Id. 
Similarly, Mr. Steelsmith has markedly changed his dependency on alcohol and 
made great improvements to his mental attitude and stability during his period of 
retained jurisdiction. (See Tr., pp.42-45.) His brother also attested to the fact that 
Mr. Steelsmith had changed his outlook on his dependency on alcohol and become 
more amenable to continued treatment to deal with that addiction. (Tr., p.48, Ls.10-19.) 
Furthermore, besides this apparently being Mr. Steelsmith's first felony conviction, the 
record shows that he accepted responsibility for his acts. (Tr., p.26, Ls.12-14.) His 
family and friends have shown considerable interest in his future. (See Tr., p.48, L.10 -
p.49, L.9.) All these factors, just like in Shideler, lead to the conclusion that 
Mr. Steelsmith's "character and the circumstances surrounding this case are compelling 
in nature, and sufficiently outweigh the gravity of the crime and the protection of the 
public interest to require this Court, in the furtherance of justice," to implement a more 
lenient disposition on Mr. Steelsmith. See Shideler, 103 Idaho at 593. 
Therefore, based on the both the instruction from the Legislature and the 
rationale of the Idaho Supreme Court in Shideler and Owen, a more lenient disposition 
is justified based on a sufficient consideration of these factors. See Merwin, 131 Idaho 
at 648. Putting Mr. Steelsmith on felony probation would have provided the necessary 
protection to society while allowing him the opportunity to rehabilitate himself by getting 
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outpatient treatment and building his support network, particularly by forging 
relationships with his daughter and grandchildren.13 And, as his brother recognized, 
Mr. Steelsmith had been doing decently well over the last three to four years, cutting 
back significantly on his drinking. (PSI, pp.7-B.) Furthermore, as the prosecutor implied 
and defense counsel recommended, a period of felony probation would be the most 
appropriate sentence in this case. (See Tr., p.21, Ls.1B-19, p.25, Ls.24-25.) Such a 
disposition better addresses all the sentencing objectives. See State v. Ransom, 124 
Idaho 703, 713 (1993) (requiring that an alternative sentence demonstrate compliance 
with the sentencing objectives). 
When a district court suspends a sentence and orders probation, it still imposes a 
sentence. Therefore, both the retributive and the deterrent effects of the imposed 
sentence are still present. See State v. Crockett, 146 Idaho 13, 14-15 (Ct. App. 200B) 
(discussing how a sentence for a period of probation addresses all the sentencing 
objectives and how the role that a court's continuing jurisdiction affects those 
objectives), rev. dismissed. In addition to restricting his liberty at the discretion of his 
probation officer and the looming sentence, he is also deprived of several of his rights 
(such as the right to possess a firearm), since this is a felony offense. (Tr., p.6, 
Ls.11-17.) 
Additionally, it provides acceptable deterrence, both generally for society and 
specifically against Mr. Steelsmith. The sentence for probation would not only be 
accompanied by a significant portion of suspended prison time that could be imposed 
should Mr. Steelsmith violate probation, but it would also be accompanied by a potential 
13 The prosecutor pointed out that the critical issues, given the facts of this case, were 
providing Mr. Steelsmith with effective treatment while keeping him under close 
supervision. (Tr., p.23, Ls.11-13.) 
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subsequent designation as a "persistent violator," should Mr. Steelsmith commit another 
felony. (See Tr., p.6, L.18 - p.7, L.7.) Mr. Steelsmith acknowledged that should he 
receive additional felony charges, he would be subject to a potential unified sentence 
of life in prison, with at least five years fixed. (Tr., p.7, Ls.2-7.) This looming potential 
punishment serves as an adequate deterrent to Mr. Steelsmith. Additionally, the fact 
that a significant penalty had been imposed would act as sufficient deterrence to society 
generally. Therefore, imposing a probationary sentence would more effectively serve all 
the sentencing objectives. See Crockett, 146 Idaho at 14-15. 
What the probationary period provides that the prison sentence does not is the 
opportunity to rehabilitate in a real-world setting, allowing Mr. Steelsmith to apply the 
lessons he has gained and should continue to gain in out-patient treatment in a practical 
setting. It also allows him to continue building his support network, particularly with his 
daughter and grandchildren. And, as the prosecutor noted, the critical issues, given the 
facts of this case, were providing Mr. Steelsmith with effective treatment while keeping 
him under close supervision. (Tr., p.23, Ls.11-13.) In addition to placing him in the best 
situation to get effective treatment, felony probation would be more intensive than 
misdemeanor probation, providing the more intense supervision required in this case. 14 
Thus, the district court's insufficient consideration of these factors merits a more lenient 
disposition. See Shideler, 103 Idaho at 593. A sufficient consideration of all the factors 
reveals that Mr. Steelsmith would likely be able to succeed in a less structured 
environment. See Statton, 136 Idaho at 137. Therefore, the decision to relinquish 
14 There is no indication in Mr. Steelsmith's record that he has been subjected to felony 
probation before. (See PSI, pp.3-6.) 
28 
jurisdiction was an abuse of the district court's discretion, which this Court should 
remedy. 
III. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Steelsmith's Rule 35 
Motion For A Reduction Of Sentence In Light Of The New Evidence He Presented 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Steelsmith presented significant new evidence demonstrating his amenability 
to treatment as part of his Rule 35 motion. Included in this evidence were positive 
progress reports and completion certificates for various rehabilitative programs. He also 
informed the district court that he had been accepted into community-based treatment 
programs with the Boise Rescue Mission. In addition, he presented letters from various 
family members, who articulated their continuing support for him. The district court 
insufficiently considered this evidence, and so denied Mr. Steelsmith's Rule 35 motion 
in an abuse of its discretion. 
B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Steelsmith's Rule 
35 Motion For A Reduction Of Sentence In Light Of The New Evidence Of 
His Successful Participation In Rehabilitative Programs, His Acceptance Into 
Community Treatment Programs, And His Continuing Family Support 
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence pursuant to Rule 35 is addressed 
to the sound discretion of the sentencing court, and is essentially a plea for leniency 
which may be granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe. 
State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007). When petitioning for a sentence 
reduction pursuant to Rule 35, the defendant must show his sentence is excessive in 
light of new or additional information presented to the sentencing court. Id. "The criteria 
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for examining rulings denying the requested leniency are the same as those applied in 
determining whether the original sentence was reasonable." State v. Trent, 125 Idaho 
251, 253 (Ct. App. 1994). Therefore, the district court needed to sufficiently consider 
the recognized sentencing objectives in light of the mitigating factors as they were 
altered by the new evidence Mr. Steelsmith presented. See id. A failure to do so 
should result in a more lenient sentence. See, e.g., Cook, 145 Idaho at 489-90; Alberts, 
121 Idaho at 209; Carrasco, 114 Idaho at 354-55; Shideler, 103 Idaho at 595. 
First and foremost, Mr. Steelsmith presented significant evidence demonstrating 
his rehabilitative efforts. He demonstrated and practiced all the principles in each level 
in the Cognitive Self-Change Program and was considered to be a satisfactory 
participant. (Supp. R, pp.16-18.) He became OSHA certified and computer literate. 
(Supp. R, pp.19-20, 25-26.) Furthermore, his father, brother, and daughter all 
reaffirmed their dedication to support Mr. Steelsmith through his recovery efforts. 
(Supp. R, pp.22-23.) Most notable, however, was the statement made in the letter from 
Mr. Steelsmith's father and brother, which recognized that Mr. Steelsmith had finally 
been able to accept his problems and begin to effectively deal with them. (See Supp. 
R., p.23.) Mr. Steelsmith had become more proactive in his recovery efforts, applying, 
for example, for enrollment in the New Life Recovery Program, a program to which he 
was accepted. (Supp. R, p.24.) According to his brother, Mr. Steelsmith also had 
several job prospects pending his eventual release. (Supp. R., p.23.) 
This evidence impacts the analysis on each of the sentencing objectives, 
particularly the need for protection for society and rehabilitation. Mr. Steelsmith has 
demonstrated not only that he is willing to rehabilitate, but that he can be successful at 
it. He has also demonstrated that, were he to be afforded a sentence which provided 
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for community supervision, he had the support network in place to help him succeed in 
the community-based programs to which he had been accepted. Therefore, through his 
efforts, he presented a lower risk to society, which in turn decreased the need to protect 
society by incarcerating him. 
This is significant because sentences are to be crafted so that they do not force 
the prison system to continue detaining a person once rehabilitation or age has 
decreased the risk of recidivism. Cook, 145 Idaho at 489; Eubank, 114 Idaho at 639. 
Mr. Steelsmith's situation is exactly what the Court of Appeals was contemplating in 
both Cook and Eubank. The new evidence Mr. Steelsmith presented demonstrated that 
the treatment he received during his period of retained jurisdiction, the programs he had 
successfully completed since his relinquishment, and the assured opportunities to 
continue rehabilitating the community had, in fact, decreased the risk that he will 
reoffend. Once the impact his advancing age has been factored in, 15 this new evidence 
revealed that his sentence runs contrary to the admonition from Cook and Eubank. 
It forces the prison to continue to incarcerate him until at least July 2012,16 despite the 
fact that society no longer demands protection from him because he no longer presents 
as significant a risk to reoffend due to his rehabilitative efforts and his age. 
Furthermore, the new evidence demonstrates not just Mr. Steelsmith's past 
efforts to rehabilitate, but also his continuing commitment to rehabilitation. As his 
brother, James, advised the district court at the rider review hearing, for the first time he 
15 Mr. Steelsmith is currently fifty-five years old. (See PSI, p.1.) 
16 The district court imposed a two-year fixed term and gave credit for 372 days, leaving 
approximately one year left to serve as of July 26, 2011. (R., pp.68-69.) Whether or not 
he is paroled at that time is a decision left to the discretion of the parole board. 
See, e.g., State v. Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 931 (2005). 
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could remember, Mr. Steelsmith had admitted his alcoholism "with sincerity and 
conviction." (Tr., p.48, Ls.10-19; Supp. R., p.23.) He recognized that Mr. Steelsmith 
had experienced a breakthrough and he now had an opportunity to get his alcoholism 
under control. (Tr., p.49, Ls.1-9.) The new evidence demonstrated that Mr. Steelsmith 
did experience a breakthrough and has fundamentally changed his outlook. (See Supp. 
R., p.23.) As this is the case, his risk for recidivism has decreased, and Cook and 
Eubank instruct that a lesser sentence is justified. A lesser sentence still addresses the 
other objectives of sentencing, but it provides Mr. Steelsmith the opportunity to prove to 
the district court that he can continue to improve and properly address his addiction 
issues when faced with practical, real-world stimuli. 
In addition, the reaffirmation of support by his family, as well as his acceptance 
into the Boise Rescue Mission, demonstrates that, even though he is incarcerated, 
Mr. Steelsmith is not just maintaining, but growing his support network. For example, 
his father, brother, and daughter all wrote letters to the district court reaffirming their 
support for Mr. Steelsmith in his rehabilitation process. (Supp. R., pp.22-23.) Having 
such a support network in place is a factor which suggests a more lenient sentence is 
appropriate. See Shideler, 103 Idaho at 594-95; Kellis, 148 Idaho at 817. Allowing him 
the opportunity to continue to build that support network, particularly with his daughter 
and grandchildren, will help his rehabilitation process, and in so doing, increase the 
protection to society in the long term. 
The district court, however, insufficiently considered all of this new evidence, 
focusing only on Mr. Steelsmith's prior record to justify its sentence. This is improper in 
this case. Despite the fact that he has a lengthy record, even a repeat offender will not 
be subjected to excessive sentences. Carrasco, 114 Idaho at 355. More importantly, 
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Mr. Steelsmith has demonstrated that he can be rehabilitated and overcome his past 
failings. (See generally Supp. R.) When combined with his age, this evidence of 
rehabilitation demonstrates that he has significantly reduced his risk for recidivism, 
thus depriving the district court of that justification to support a longer prison term. 
See Cook, 145 Idaho at 489; Eubank, 114 Idaho at 639. Therefore, a sufficient 
consideration of the evidence demonstrates that the denial of the Rule 35 motion was 
an abuse of discretion. 
Mr. Steelsmith presented the district court with new evidence demonstrating that 
he has markedly changed his dependency on alcohol, has shown great improvement in 
his mental attitude and stability, apparently has no prior felony convictions, has 
accepted responsibility for his acts, and has the continuing support of family and 
community members. Compare Shideler, 103 Idaho at 595 (wherein this same set of 
factors justified a more lenient sentence). Therefore, the decision to deny his Rule 35 
Motion was an abuse of the district court's discretion. This Court should remedy that 
abuse. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Steelsmith respectfully requests that this Court vacate the illegally imposed 
fines and costs. 
Mr. Steelsmith also respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it 
deems appropriate. Alternatively, he requests that his case be remanded to the district 
court for a new disposition hearing. Alternatively, he requests that the order denying his 
Rule 35 motion be vacated and the case remanded to the district court for further 
proceedings. 
DATED this 6th day of March, 2012. 
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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